凌友詩博士論文選錄(Selection of Grace Ling’s Ph. D. Thesis)
To Revive Morality: A Kantian Critique of Rawls’s Theory of Justice
Ling, Yu
Shill, Grace
A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy at The University of Hong Kong July 2003
I owe many people who help me and
support me endlessly. For a lot of help along the way, I am most indebted to my
thesis supervisor, Dr. Michael R. Martin. No words can describe how patient and
how serious he regarded my research. As a proponent of Rawls, Dr. Martin did
encourage me to think freely in the way I proposed to explore. But he also
reminded me to notice the traps, which were partly caused by my
misunderstanding of Rawls and partly caused by my over confidence. He was also
concerned with the overall performance of my dissertation. Every grammatical
mistake, even in the footnotes, could not escape from his eyes, although many
mistakes may yet remain, for which I am sorry. In order to help me submit this
dissertation by the date required, he interrupted his holiday overseas and came
back to Hong Kong to supervise me in the final stage of my thesis writing.
Maybe he came from another half of the earth, but I know his selfless care of
me is much more and fairer than this long way to go.
Among the other
teachers who highly deserve my profound gratitude, I would like to mention Dr.
Daniel A. Bell. He supervised me for two years in Hong Kong University. While I
was embarrassed by many topics worth studying in the earlier stage of my research,
he was so patient to read each essay I wrote when I was still searching for
direction. After he left, he was still quite generous to share his opinions
with me. In addition, I am deeply grateful for all the brilliant scholars in
our Philosophy Department. As an audience at the departmental seminars, I
learned so much from them in different disciplines of philosophy. In addition,
I would like to mention supervisors for my M.phil degree, Prof. Jiang Ying Hao Prof-
Su Wen Zhou in the Chinese Department of The Chinese University of Hong Kong
and Prof. Lee Nan Hsiong in the Department of Government and Public
Administration of The Chinese University of Hong Kong. They not only gave me
knowledge but also cultivated me both in character and academic attitude. I am
grateful deeply for their teaching and will remember their love now and
forever. A note of appreciation should be added here to my family members. My
father brought me up in a very difficult environment. His love always
encourages me and warms up my heart. While I was dealing with my thesis, I felt
sorry for my husband for the lonely time he spent by himself. In addition, I
should mention my sweetest son. He is quite independent and disciplined. I do
believe he understands what I did and will do better than me in future.
If I could say “thank
you” to lots of thinkers I have never seen, I would like to express my highest
respect to all authors who inspired my thinking in this thesis, especially to
Kant, Rawls and Mou Zong San Professor Mou was regarded as the most eminent
figure of the third wave of neo-Confucianism. His enterprise of accommodating
Confucianism and Kantianism brought Chinese philosophy into modem discourse and
also provoked my interests in Kant’s practical philosophy. I will never forget
Mou’s saying to philosophy students: “As a thinker, you must have a genuine
feeling of existence, an existence in the world of chaos and at the time of
human predicament.” He knows the power of philosophy, especially at a time
needing philosophy. Today is the time which needs philosophy. I can feel how
great the responsibility is for me to use philosophy at this moment and in this
world.
To Revive Morality: A Kantian Critique of Rawls’s Theory of Justice
submitted by Ling, Yu Shih, Grace for
the Degree of Ph.D. (philosophy)
at The University of Hong Kong in July
2003
According to communitarianism,
contemporary liberalism is the offspring of modernization. Conversely, the
development of liberalism justifies and encourages the atmosphere of the modem
world. One conspicuous phenomenon arising in our disenchanted world is a
decline in morality. For more than thirty years, communitarians have endeavored
to elevate moral agents, good moral character, virtues, human goods and a solid
community. Their fruitful achievements challenge the liberal domination of
moral and political philosophy. Advancing a new perspective, this dissertation
criticizes several features and doctrines of contemporary liberalism by
reference to Kant’s practical philosophy. The author chooses Rawls’s theory of
justice as the target. That is because Rawls shares most of the common features
of liberalism and his precise works have strengthened liberalism both in theory
and practice. Since contemporary liberals, including Rawls, tend to borrow
vocabularies and arguments from Kant, a Kantian critique of liberalism is
indeed an approach which discusses liberal deficiencies from within.
The question which moves Kant is how
to distinguish a true sense of morality from spurious moralities. His endeavor
to find a true sense of morality strikes at the question of why morality has
declined in the modem world. Kant as well as the author of this dissertation
believe that if we can differentiate a genuine morality from the spurious
moralities which arise from many moral or political theories, then we will know
how to revive it.
Following Kant’s metaphysics of
morals, this dissertation appeals to certain concepts which Kant thinks of as
fundamental elements of morals, and which I use as the tools to assess Rawls’s
theory of justice. My first concern is what sort of determining ground of the
will a person stands on when he chooses a principle, the a priori moral law, the feeling of pleasure or
eudaimonia. My second concern is what sort of reason - theoretical reason,
technical practical reason or pure practical reason - gives us laws. Third, by
analyzing the concept of Right, I try to answer the question of whether we can
constitute a world of morality by means of enforcing liberties and rights. Fourth,
I resort to Kant’s conception of humanity which for Kant is the root of a moral
conception of freedom of action, so that we can well answer the question of how
we can understand accurately freedom of action and its limits so that moral
goods can shape the scope of liberties and rights.
Beyond the liberal-communitarian
debates, this dissertation attempts to resuscitate morality by finding light
from Kant. It may rejuvenate Kantian ethics as well. I believe this dissertation
may give room to a new topic in moral and political philosophy, that is, to
accommodate Kantianism and communitarianism, while explaining the predicament
of morality in our era.
Introduction
1
Chapter
One: To Discern “Morality” in Terms of the Determining Ground of the Will 11
1.1 Morality:
the moral law as the determining ground of the will 15
1.1.1 Kant’s
notion of the determining ground of the will 16
1.1.2 Rawls
begins with “what is the first virtue of social institutions”? 18
1.1.3 Kant
begins with “what is freedom?” 24
1.1.4 Pure
practical will and pathological affected will 26
1.2 The
moral law in Kant’s metaphysics of morals 29
1.2.1 The
moral law as a priori: independent of experience 30
1.2.2 A
morally practical law as the form of a moral maxim 33
1.2.3 The
moral law as cognized by pure practical reason alone 37
1.2.4 Kant
refutes skepticism 42
1.2.5 Three
Formulas and the critique of empty formalism 45
1.2.6 Four
moral endowments 53
1.3 The
necessity to distinguish intellectual desire from pathological desire 58
1.3.1 Principles
of justice as chosen to advance one’s interests 60
1.3.2 Two
different concepts of desire 65
1.3.3 Pathological
desire: “pleasure” as an object preceding the desire 68
1.3.4 Intellectual
desire: “pleasure” simply as the effect of pure reason 71
1.4 The
feeling of pleasure furnishes no moral law 76
1.4.1 The
feeling of pleasure generates merely rational practical precepts 77
1.4.2 Rawls’s
contentions and their failure 81
1.4.3 The
Theory of Justice, Epicureanism and Utilitarianism 86
1.4.4 The
moral law is prior to the moral good: Kant criticizes perfectionism
1.5 Concluding
remarks 93
Chapter
Two: Which Rationality? Is Rawlsian Justice an End or a Means 96
2.1 Kant:
three taxonomies of ends and their corresponding conceptions of rationality 102
2.1.1 Ends
of self-love and one’s own happiness 103
2.1.2 Ends
following from hypothetical imperatives 104
2.1.3 Ends
of the moral law 107
2.1.4 Pure
practical reason and technical practical reason 108
2.1.5 Theoretical
Reason as the counterpart of technical reason 111
2.1.6 Is
an end of self-love rational or natural? 114
2.2
Rawls’s conception of goodness and that of rationality 118
2.2.1 The
parties in the original position 118
2.2.2 From
the thin theory of the good to the full theory of the good 121
2.2.3 Goodness
as rationality 125
2.2.4 The
concept of “good for” 128
2.2.5 A
rational plan of life and its conception of rationality 131
2.2.6 Rawls
and technical practical reason 136
2.3 Can
moral sense be derived from technical practical reason? The well-ordered society
as a modus vivendi 140
2.3.1 Hypothetical
imperatives, means and external incentives 142
2.3.2 Reciprocal
coercion: the rationale for civil society 143
2.3.3 The
origin of justice: Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Hegel and Rawls 147
2.3.4 Hobbes-style
expediency: a society with chronic mutual fear 152
2.3.5 Being
a beneficiary as the condition of obedience 156
2.3.6 Defining
society in terms of its function 157
2.4 Anti-humanity,
persons as things 160
2.4.1 A
good person as something others rationally want 159
2.4.2 The
conception of a thing: possession, use and alienation 164
2.4.3 Humanity
and respect in Kant’s moral philosophy 169
2.4.4 The
political implications of being anti-humanity 172
2.5 Concluding
remarks 179
Chapter
Three: The “Right-Morality” Gap — A Close Scrutiny of Kant’s Conceptions of
Right, Duty and the Subject’s Incentive 184
3.1 Right:
by virtue of a person’s humanity 191
3.1.1 The
concept of Right and its justification 191
3.1.2 Rawls’s
theory as a paradigm of a right-based theory 195
3.1.3 Rights,
obligations and coercion 200
3.1.4 Actions,
a subject of Right and a subject of morality 204
3.1.5 Three
passive features of the concept of Right 206
3.2 Duty:
includes that of a good will 210
3.2.1 Morally
practical law, obligation and duty 211
3.2.2 Duties
of Right and duties of virtue 214
3.2.3 The
subject of duty and the active obligation 216
3.2.4 Internal
incentive and external incentive 217
3.2.5 Ethics:
internal lawgiving, self-constraint and internal incentive 220
3.3 Right-morality
gap 224
3.3.1 The
“object” of Right is the “subject” of the duty of Right 225
3.3.2 Internal
incentive: the prominent indicator of morality 228
3.3.3 Right:
external action and external incentive 231
3.3.4 The
necessity to consider strict Right 236
3.3.5 The
concept of Right may inspire actions of legality 239
3.3.6 Deriving
morality from Strict Right is impossible 242
3.3.7 Do
civil laws cultivate morality? 245
3.4 Are
ethical virtues innate in Right-based theories? 246
3.4.1 Mill:
finding truth and self-actualization 248
3.4.2 Locke:
self-direction within natural law 250
3.4.3 Macedo:
executive virtues and liberal virtues 252
3.4.4 Rawls:
political virtues as instrumental virtues 255
3.4.5 Instrumental
virtues do not have an intrinsic value 257
3.5 Kant’s
Virtue Ethics 260
3.5.1 Contemporary
debates on Kant regarding virtue ethics 261
3.5.2 Nietzsche:
the genealogy of morals 268
3.5.3 Self-demanding
vs. volte-face valuing standing point 273
3.5.4 Deficiencies
of simply claiming the Right 280
3.6 Concluding
remarks: bringing the Right back to within the scope of ethics 284
Chapter
Four: The Moral Conception of Freedom of Action and Its Limit in Kant’s Idea of
Humanity 290
4.1 Typical
arguments on freedom of action 294
4.1.1 Kant’s
broad sense and narrow sense of freedom of action 295
4.1.2 Rawls:
The Priority of Right 300
4.1.3 Rawls:
The priority of liberty as an autocracy of liberty 304
4.1.4 The
first principle of justice: a purely formal concept 306
4.1.5 The
dialogue between Mill and Devlin: protection of individuals vs.
protection of society 309
4.1.6 The
necessity to appeal to the concept of humanity 312
4.2 What
does Kant mean by humanity? 314
4.2.1 A
plain definition of Humanity: the capacity to set ends for oneself 314
4.2.2 Three
possible interpretations of humanity 316
4.2.3 Two
aspects of humanity: phenomenon and noumenon 323
4.3 Man’s
capacity for setting moral ends as the core and foundation of humanity 327
4.3.1 Morality
illuminates human dignity 328
4.3.2 Moral
autonomy declares man as an end in itself 331
4.3.3 Pure
practical reason generates and secures humanity 335
4.3.4 Moral
ends as the constraint of all subjective ends 338
4.3.5 Is
there a difference between humanity and personality? 341
4.3.6 The
ground for humanity: subsistence or a consequence? 346
4.4 Three
criteria for the limits of freedom of action in its moral conception 352
4.4.1 The
Right of humanity and the end of humanity 354
4.4.2 Freedom
of action as a right 356
4.4.3 Three
moral criteria for the limits of Right 360
4.4.4 Can
duties of virtue be enforced by statutes? 365
4.4.5 What
Kant says that ethical lawgiving cannot be external 368
4.5 Concluding
Remarks 372
Conclusion
375
Appendix
384
Bibliography
389
According to Alasdair MacIntyre,
contemporary morality is suffering from the effects of a figurative
catastrophe.[1] [2] To explain
why and how this catastrophe has come about becomes a great challenge for
contemporary moral philosophers and political philosophers. In this
dissertation, I make an intellectual enquiry into the question of why morality
in contemporary times is declining and losing its strength both in theory and
practice. This question will go through the whole dissertation. Briefly
speaking, contemporary moral disorder reveals itself in the following three
ways:
First, the nature of morality becomes
more and more equivocal. Morality, per se, loses its clear appearance. Charles
Taylor calls this phenomenon the “ethics of inarticulacy” in his Sources of the
Self. We not only lack concrete objective criteria to assess our maxims, the
stratum that is used for assessing our maxims, namely a clear sense of
morality, is also shaky. Before dealing with a normative moral question or
evaluating the moral worth of an action, we should know what we can call moral. This implies that there should be
certain fundamental criteria to indicate the true nature of morality and which
distinguish morality from other disciplines. Confusion of the true nature of
morality is a typical feature of moral disorder, and in turn it will cause a
greater disorder in further moral inquiries.
Second, the ambiguity of morality
entails “moral emotivism”, as Macintyre calls it in After Virtue. For
Macintyre, the most striking phenomenon of contemporary moral utterances is
that “so many of the utterances are used to express disagreements, and those
disagreements are interminable.”[3] For
example, in one debate, e.g. whether abortion should be removed from the domain
of criminal law, there are at least three rival arguments.[4]
MacIntyre finds that their premises are incommensurable and he argues that the
conceptually incommensurable premises of the rival arguments have a wide
variety of historical origins.[5] There
seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement. MacIntyre ascribes the
label emotivism[6] to such a
feature by arguing that “if we possess no unassailable criteria and no set of
compelling reasons by means of which to convince our opponents, then it seems
that underlying any given position there must be some non-rational decision to
adopt that position.”[7]
Third, a kind of morality which is
anchored in liberties and rights and which claims a moral authorization to
impose obligations on others substitutes for traditional morals which are
anchored in the agent of morality and claim self-constraint and volition to
impose obligations on oneself. Although most liberals who elevate liberties and
rights are concerned only with principles which regulate public affairs,
liberal principles nevertheless have developed into a life and thinking style
which encompass a field beyond politics. Francis Fukuyama, who wrote The End of
History and the Last Man.[8] gives a
warning on this trend in his latest book, Trust: the Social Virtue and the
Creation of Prosperity. He notes that as we drift into an extreme
rights-centered individualism, a radical departure from our past communitarian
tradition is more dangerous for the future of a society than any competition
from abroad.[9] It seems
to me that an increasing rights-centered individualism destroys such a moral
tradition and conversely claims one’s entitlement to put others under
obligations. A kind of active moral practice is gradually altered to become a
passive moral practice.
In order to revive morality, we have
to do the following things: (1) envisage the concept of morality and discern
the true sense of it; (2) find a ground which prescribes moral judgments
absolutely and objectively; and (3) point out the deficiencies and peril of
rights-centered individualism and bring them back to within the scope of
traditional morals.
Most discussion of the above questions
are hitherto communitarian critiques of liberalism. In the view of the typical
figures of communitarians, contemporary moral decline and disorder is mostly
caused by three deviations:
The first deviation is the overemphasis
on deontological moral judgments which neglects the agent of morality but
emphasizes actions of conformity. MacIntyre distinguishes deontological moral
judgments from moralities of virtues
and calls them moralities of rules.[10] Anscombe
notes that when deontological ethics lost their religious root, such
deontological principles or rules, which are abstract, but require universal
compliance, no matter what particular roles people play and what community and
culture they belong to, become more and more “harmful”.[11]
[12]
The second deviation is the cutting
off of an organic network among persons. Charles Taylor claims that
contemporary liberalism constitutes simply a Hobbesian and atomistic society.[13] Michael
Sandel criticizes such a society as simply an instrument for mutual benefits”.[14] The
rationale of its structure does not comprise the tradition and the common
project which are regarded as the most crucial elements for the solidity of a
community.[15]
The third deviation is that liberals
conceive a person as an abstract being that has been deprived of his cultural
and historical attributes. MacIntyre draws our attention to the point that in
the liberal context of “privatization of the good”, moral principles are
independent of a person’s allotted role and human flourishing.[16] The
person as such is called by Michael Sandel an “unencumbered self’.[17] All
substances, e.g. family, community and religion, which are supposed to benefit
from human flourishing in the traditional era no longer provide meaning to an
unencumbered self. The person therefore loses all the attachments which might
constitute his identity.[18]
Communitarians point out certain
serious deficiencies of liberalism, but communitarian critiques encounter
challenges and difficulties also.
First, communitarianism and liberalism
each seem to take its place in a scheme of things. The state of intellectual
polarization makes contemporary moral and political philosophy continuously
stuck in a dilemma. For example, liberals insist that liberties and human
rights are derived from the dignity of human beings.[19]
Rawls proposes that principles anchored in liberties and rights should be the
primary principles of morality and should be put at the first priority in
politics.[20] Their
insistence is quite vigorous, because it seems grounded on certain metaphysical
assumptions, although most liberals are inclined not to accept metaphysics.
Communitarians are more or less compelled to accept liberal proposals. In
addition, liberals attempt to reply to the communitarian critique. John Rawls
and Ronald Dworkin argue that a liberal society founded on these values is not
a modus vivendi but a community
having intrinsic value.[21] Rawls
also contends that his principles of social structure do not eliminate the
other moral goods. All moral goods compatible with the principles of liberal social
structure are welcomed and must be well developed.[22]
Communitarians provide not too many satisfactory answers to these liberal
contentions.
Second, communitarian proposals face
more difficulties in practice than in theory. According to communitarian
thinking, the resuscitation of virtues and the coherence of society rely on
fraternity that should be cultivated in family, kinship, locality, religion and
social rank. Unfortunately, in the age of modernity the social fabric has
dramatically changed. The constitution of our social structure is no longer
hierarchical. Social and geographical mobilities, the use of the internet, as
well as divisibility in every aspect of human activity, erode the human
infrastructure which helps cultivate our moral personality.[23]
Recently, virtue ethicists of caring, such as Michael Slote, pay more attention
to the agent of morality and to human innate love and care, although they are
still concerned with social attachments which provide opportunities for people
in modem society to develop virtues.[24]
This trend shows that communitarians who rely too much on social attachments
face a predicament of rapid social disintegration.
In order to show what the world of
liberalism constitutes, we need tools which provide different perspectives and
vocabularies other than those which communitarianism has provided. Although
most communitarians regard Kant as the origin of modem liberalism, and indeed
contemporary liberals and Kant share certain vocabularies, I am inclined to
think that Kant’s practical philosophy is different from contemporary
liberalism and that there are three reasons we should consider Kant as a good
critic of contemporary liberalism.
First, Kant criticizes how “moral
philosophers had up to now failed to account for our most basic moral
concepts”.[25]
Therefore, Kant articulates a metaphysics of morals which clearly distinguishes
basic moral concepts and postulates a transcendental ground to ensure moral
principles as absolute and objective. Distinctive from the perspective of
virtues or a community, the Kantian metaphysics of morals concentrates in the determining
ground of the will, the faculty of moral reasoning, the concept of Right and
the idea of humanity. It helps us discover significant differences between a true
sense of morality and a spurious morality.
Secondly, Kant establishes an
essential and complete framework which has unity of the
form of the will, plurality of the
matter, and the totality of the
system of the forms and the matters in order for students to grasp a whole
picture of moral world (see 1.2).[26] For Kant,
each maxim that has true moral value should comprise and manifest these three
connotations and should “harmonize with a .possible kingdom of ends as with a
kingdom of nature”.[27] Kant does
not simply concentrate in formulating political principles or cultivating moral
virtues by means of empirical human flourishing. We can explain all moral
concepts systematically in his conceptual framework of morality.
Third, most contemporary liberals
imitate Kant’s terms and words or borrow certain concepts from Kant, such as
liberty, right, choice, capacity, dignity and humanity. It is not easy to have
an accurate critique of contemporary liberalism, as the communitarians claim to
do, merely by appealing to a group of words and concepts from traditional moral
theories which are foreign to contemporary liberalism. Many deficiencies in
contemporary liberalism should be disclosed from within. For example, while
political liberalism insists on formulating principles independent of
metaphysical and ethical doctrines, Kant construes a state, human liberties and
rights within the scope of his conception of ethics. When Rawls proposes the
priority of right over the good, we should ask where his belief in human
liberty and equality comes from. Kant, who is regarded as the predecessor of
contemporary liberalism, should know that his followers have deviated from him.
I choose Rawls as the typical
representative of contemporary liberalism to critique because he articulates
his theory of justice precisely and has had a great impact on contemporary
moral and political philosophy. However, this dissertation intends to criticize
contemporary liberalism, not for Rawls’s specific ideas, such as the original
position, the maximin rule or the difference principle, but rather for some
common ideas most liberal thinkers share, such as interests, liberties, rights,
reasons, social cooperation, humanity, and so on. I will proceed to my Kantian
critique with four questions respectively discussed in the four Chapters.
The first two Chapters concentrate attention
on finding a true sense of morality and disclosing spurious moralities which
occupy contemporary moral philosophy. In the first Chapter, I ask what sort of determining
ground of the will does a person stand on when he chooses a principle, the a priori moral law, the feeling of pleasure or
eudaimonia. Kant contends that the determining ground of the will which
produces morally practical laws is the a priori moral law. The feeling of pleasure
furnishes no moral laws but simply rational
practical precepts. Since Rawls refuses to admit any
metaphysical ground, his theory of justice can be only anchored in the feeling
of pleasure. In Rawls’s context, the two principles of justice are rational
practical precepts. In addition to showing the prudential nature of Rawls’s
theory, Chapter One also answers certain questions raised in moral philosophy,
such as those concerning moral luck (see
1.2.6)
, moral relativism and emotivism (see 1.2.6),
Kant’s empty formalism (see
1.2.7)
and the burdens of judgment (see 1.2.4). Also,
in terms of the feeling of pleasure as the determining ground of the will, I
distinguish between Rawls’s theory of justice and epicureanism and
utilitarianism (see 1.4.3). According to Kant’s notion of the moral law prior
to the moral good, a Kantian critique of communitarians is also discussed in
Chapter One (see 1.4.4).
In the second Chapter, I probe the
question of what sort of reason of the citizens in Rawls’s theory use to give
laws, theoretical reason, technical practical reason or pure practical reason. Rawls
does not clearly define “reason”. I must appeal to his conception of goodness
as rationality which justifies his two principles of justice. Because the
conception of goodness as rationality implies technical practical reason and a
conception of good for, we find that a so-called well-ordered society is not a modus vivendi but simply a
Hobbesian expediency. Some current controversies are also discussed in this
chapter. For example, “are ends of self-love natural or rational?” (see 2.1.6)
and “Is faculty of morality natural or rational?” (see 2.2.5). The “possessive
market society” which Macpherson describes for liberal society is also
discussed in Chapter Two (see
2.4.2)
.[28]
The third Chapter deals with the
strongest argument which liberals uphold and communitarians almost cannot
reject. I question whether we can constitute a world of morality by means of
enforcing liberties and rights. In terms of Kant’s conception of Right, I
contend that the subject of Right cannot ensure conformity from internal
incentive for his object (the person who is assumed to be put under the
obligation of one’s Right). Therefore, morals anchored in rights and liberties
can only constitute the world of legality, but not the world of morality. Based
on the conclusion I get from the concept of Right in this Chapter I also
discuss several topics of debate, for example, whether Kant is a virtue
ethicist or duty ethicist (see 3.5.1) and the significant point which
distinguishes virtue ethics and rule ethics (see 3.5.3).
The fourth Chapter also deals with a
very tough attitude liberals hold regarding the priority of right over the good.
I speculate on the questions of “what consequences may be caused by Rawls’s
notion of the priority of right over the good?” and “how can we understand
accurately freedom of action and its limits so that moral goods can shape the
scope of liberties and rights?”. In this Chapter, I take Kant’s conception of
humanity as the core idea and attempt to show human beings as moral beings, and
formulate a moral conception of freedom of action in terms of humanity.
Whether one will accept all the
postulates Kant prescribes or not, this dissertation provides a framework for
analysis and a critique of contemporary liberalism.
……
From the perspective of Kant’s notion
of the determining ground of the will, this
chapter helps solve three problems.
First, we distinguish the moral
principles determined by the will grounded on the a priori moral law and the so-called moral
principles determined by the will grounded on the feeling of pleasure. In
Kant’s view, the former are the principles of morality (which Kant calls
universal practical laws or moral laws); the latter is spurious morality.[29]
[30] Some
moral theories which obliterate the distinction between the moral law and the
feeling of pleasure as the determining ground of the will can be separated out.
For Kant, they cannot be regarded truly as moral theories.
Second, a problem which for a long
time puzzles moral philosophers is how can we falsify theories which formulate
principles based on happiness, pleasure or self-love? Some theories seem so
strong that we cannot deny them simply by complaining that they are egoistic or
neglect the rights of individuals. Kant admits that “happiness itself
objectively belongs to our being”, and it may seem that we cannot override the
necessity of it by rights that are also thought to belong to us. Anyway, appealing
to Kant’s notion of the determining ground of the will, we refuse to regard
principles anchored in happiness or pleasure as principles of morality. To do
this we need to scrutinize the determining ground of the will which prescribes
principles, rather than compare happiness with rights among individuals. Our
perspective is sustained by finding out how to recognize the will which has the
feeling of pleasure as its determining ground. Kant points out that if a desire
aims at the representation of the existence of a thing, that is, if there is an
object preceding the desire, then such a desire is pathological desire. All
objects preceding pathological desire can be regarded as the feeling of
pleasure, one’s happiness, or self-love, since the reality of a thing must
eventually cause pleasure or happiness which we want. When the will anchors
itself in the reality of a thing, it must have the feeling of pleasure as its
determining ground. Such a will furnishes no moral laws. The principles
commanded by such a will are simply rational practical precepts, because
rational practical precepts are principles by which we find means. The will,
according to the law of causality, finds means for fulfilling the reality of
the thing we desire, so that pleasure, happiness or self-love is achieved. Since
rational practical precepts have merely subjective conditioned necessity, they
cannot be regarded as moral laws.
Theories of promoting happiness do not
necessarily formulate moral principles unless they presuppose an a priori moral ground for assuring and
limiting the conception of happiness, as does Kant’s.[31]
[32]
Third, we find that Rawls’s principles
of justice are rational practical precepts, not moral laws. Although the phrase
“citizens are free and equal” is emphasized in Rawls’s theory, a more decisive
point in his categorical procedure is that each party, in choosing between
principles, tries as best he can to advance his interests?01 The determining
ground of the parties’ will is the feeling of pleasure. Although Rawls’s theory
in some ways has an appearance that is similar to Kant’s, Rawls’s theory
differs from Kant’s in the determining ground of the will for a principle and
thus formulates different sorts of principles. The two principles of justice would
be morally practical laws if and only if the will determining them grounds
itself on the moral law, without regard to any consideration of self-interest
and self-love.
This chapter also introduces Kant’s
metaphysics of morals, including Kant’s views about the moral law, pure
practical reason, several formulas and the four moral endowments. A Kantian
perspective is fundamental to our discussion which follows. Rawls is aware of
the prudential nature of his conception of justice and tries to testify the moral
worth of his principles by arguing from the perspective of the full theory of
the good and the perspective of the concept of Right. In the next two chapters
I will explicate the prudential nature of Rawls’s theory more fully, by
examining technical practical reason which he
wields in formulating his principles, and by examining the concept of Right which most liberals respect as the
moral ground for the justification of their theories.
……
There is a need to emphasize again
that what I intend to object to is not the two principles of justice
themselves, but the way Rawls justifies them. The two principles of justice for
me are indeed objective moral laws and should be complied with universally, but
Rawls’s theory makes them descend into prudential precepts, namely hypothetical
imperatives.
Rawls indeed anticipates that when the
principles are mutually recognized among peoples over a certain period of time
and people see those norms as advantageous for themselves and for those they
care for, people will invoke an effective and final sentiment of justice and
will embrace those principles as an ideal of conduct.253 But I
contend that Rawls’s argument based on congruence, which tries to assimilate a
hypothetical imperative to a categorical imperative, is unsuccessful. The
problem is that Rawls anchors his argument in the idea of goodness as rationality. It is an idea of good for, where technical practical reason is at work. In terms
of the idea of good for, the two principles of justice are nevertheless
hypothetical imperatives, and the society established on the basis of this idea
is simply a means, an artifice in Hume’s word or Hobbes-style expediency in Jean Hampton’s
phrase. A means, for Kant, refers to something which has simply conditional
worth. The condition upholding a so-called well ordered society is the
reciprocal assurance and mutual interests of the parties’ community. If this
condition is lacking, the social order will collapse. That is
253The Law of Peoples,
p. 44.
why I call Rawlsian society a modus vivendi. A great and
dangerous implication worth noticing in his theory is the tendency to treat persons as merely means. Although Rawls
elevates the worth of liberties and rights of persons, his theory makes people
treat each other, including themselves, as objects they rationally want. The
conception of a person is not coherent in his theory. His veiled anti-humanity presumptions might
lead to coercive conclusions with regard to other cultures and peoples
heterogeneous to his conception of justice.
Rawls’ way of thinking does not
provide a proper access to understanding morality. Kant has a brilliant remark
about how to develop the virtues. In a footnote concerning external incentives
to virtues, he says:
I have a
letter from the late excellent Sulzer in which he asks me what the cause might
be that the teachings of virtue, however much they contain that is convincing
to reason, accomplish so little. [...] However, my answer is simply that the
teachers themselves have not brought their concepts to purity, but, since they
want to do too well by hunting everywhere for motives to moral goodness, in
trying to make their medicine really strong they spoil it. For the most
ordinary observation shows that if we represent, on the one hand, an action of
integrity done with steadfast soul, apart from every view to advantage of any
kind in this world or another and even under the greatest temptations of need
or allurement, it leaves far behind and eclipses any similar act that was
affected in the least by an extraneous incentive; it elevates the soul and
awakens a wish to be able to act in like manner oneself. Even children of
moderate age feel this impression, and one should never represent duties to
them in any other way.254
Rawls in hunting everywhere for the
moral incentive of justice may eventually spoil it. Kant insists that a categorical
imperative is unconditional and thus has an objective
necessity. As an end in itself, a categorical imperative is
different in nature from a hypothetical imperative, since the latter is conditional
and thus has only a subjectively
conditioned necessity. Also, they are inspired from different
faculties of reason, pure practical reason
commanding the former and technical practical
reason commanding the latter. Hume does not accept the theory
of pure practical reason, but he also finds that though justice is artificial,
the sense of its morality is natural.255 In Kant’s view, it is
obvious that an “artifice” and “morality” should be ascribed to distinct
logics. Morality cannot be successfully cultivated simply by a long-time
practice of an artificial arrangement or by gaining advantages form the
artifice. Justice would be a moral law if and only if it is generated from pure
practical reason, not from calculations by technical practical reason. Morality
is action presented according to the objective moral law; moral action is done
from duty; that is, the action is an end in itself, and is unconditional. Let
us conclude this chapter with Kant’s words:
The
genuine moral incentive of pure
practical reason is nothing other than the pure moral law itself insofar as it
lets us discover the sublimity of our own supersensible existence and
subjectively effects respect for their higher vocation in human beings, who are
at the same time conscious of their sensible existence and of the dependence on
their pathological affected nature. Now, so many charms and attractions of
254
GMM [4:411], Kant’s footnote.
255
A Treatise of
Human Nature, p. 619.
life may well be connected with this
incentive that even for their sake alone the most prudent choice
of a reasonable Epicurean, reflecting on the greatest well-being of life, would
declare itself for moral conduct; and it can even be advisable to connect this
prospect of a cheerful enjoyment of life with that incentive which is supreme
and already sufficiently determining of itself. [...] For that would be
tantamount to wanting to taint the pure moral disposition in its source. The
majesty of duty has nothing to do with the enjoyment of life; it has its own
law and its own court, and even though one might want to shake both of them
together thoroughly, so as to give them blended, like medicine, to the sick
soul, they soon separate of themselves; if they do not, the former will effect
nothing at all, and though physical life might gain some force, the moral life
would fade away irrecoverably.256
In order to enhance categorical
imperatives, we must:
(1)
Be cautious about moral theories which
confuse categorical imperatives and hypothetical imperatives. The distinctive
logic of categorical imperatives should be respected.
(2)
We must turn our eyes to a wider ethical
background that explains human beings and the origin of morality, because true
moral sentiment would not develop unless we cultivate it within the realm of
virtues.
Rawls’s insistence on constituting a
political theory not derived from any ethical assumptions makes him fall into a
dilemma. Because he doesn’t consider virtues, such as the virtue of love and
the virtue of respect, as the foundation of the “democratic well ordered
society”, constant fear and tensions arise amongst citizens in a well ordered
society, which merely sustains itself through a prudential and fragile
counterbalance.
……
This chapter deals with the concept of
Right and attempts to clarify the ambiguous relationship between Right and
morality that arises in contemporary moral philosophy. It has reached four
conclusions.
First, the concept of Right, as a
concept of justifying something I am entitled to have, reveals the passive feature of morals. If somebody
infringes my rights, he is morally wrong; but I, as the subject of Right, do
not have to present any action other than protecting what is mine. In
particular, I do not have to present any moral action.
Second, most right-based theories
conceive Right as independent from all metaphysical moral and philosophical
doctrines. Right-based theories carefully confine themselves within the strict
concept of Right. Since the
strict concept of Right does not require actions to be done from internal
incentive (which is to say that it does not require someone to act from duty,
but simply to act by duty), the action accomplished is not necessarily but only
contingently moral. Theoretically we cannot achieve morality simply by
conceiving the object of Right as the subject of morality, nor can morality be
conduced via practicing the principles of justice in the context of a mutual
advantageous cooperative venture. That only leads us to the Right-morality gap, for there is no
logical alignment of the concept of Right to the concept of morality.
Third, for contemporary liberals, the
relation of ethics to Right is external, not internal. (Here I use “ethics” as
in Kant’s conception. See 3.2.5.) Ethics is a companion or an instrument but
not a component of the concept of Right. In other words, moral virtues are
permissible if they do not override the principles of Right; political virtues are
indispensable if they help preserve principles of Right and a just society. In
this sense, the Right-morality gap has not yet been bridged. Endeavors to fill
up the gap, such as Rawls’s argument from congruence (see 2.2) and attempts by
Stephen Macedo and Peter Berkowitz to stress the pedigree of rights and liberty
do not successfully bridge the gap between Right and morality.
Fourth, this Chapter indirectly
refutes Rawls’s notion that political concept of justice is independent of all
ethical doctrine. An ethical theory must be prior to the concept of Right.
Rather, this Chapter claims to bring the concept of Right back to ethics, that
is, the concept of Right should be incorporated as a concept of ethics and be
construed within the concept of ethics. If strict
Right is brought back to ethics, duties of
Right are no longer coercive duties but ethical duties. The subject of Right
and the object of Right (the subject of duties of Right) both regard the duties
given by Right as the result of internal lawgiving and self-constraint, rather
than juridical lawgiving and external constraints. As the subject of duties of
Right acts in accordance with duties not from external incentive (including
coercion) but from internal incentive, the subject of duties of Right is not
merely an “object of Right” but a “subject of morality”.
We have five
reasons to bring the concept of strict
Right back to ethics.
(1)
Rawls and Dworkin try to explain why we
should respect others’ rights (why we should be just) through a conception of a
happy life.[33] However, appealing
to our well-being as the determining ground of our will to choose a principle
cannot lead to a moral law (universal practical laws) but only to prudential
precepts (rational practical laws), as discussed in Chapter One. The feeling of
pleasure is not a moral foundation but just incurs a prudential ground for the
principle of respect for other’s Right (see Chapter Two).
(2)
An action is morally praiseworthy if and only
if it is done out of a sense of ethics. We have to bridge the Right-morality
gap so that actions conform to Right out of a true moral sentiment. This will
not happen unless the conception of Right itself is an ethical conception. An ethical conception of Right not only
requires the conception of Right procuring its ethical justification for
ethics, but also requires that the duties Right prescribed must be necessarily
constmed as ethical duties, not
merely coercive duties.
(3)
Recent overemphasis on Right has eroded man’s
moral powers and the coherence of the community as well. To uphold our
humanity, it is urgent for us to revive our confident, open and sincere spirit.
The best way to do this would be to conceive the concept of Right as falling
within the concept of ethics. Therefore the cultivation of justice must come
from ethical allurement, not prudential counsel.
(4)
As Plato remarks in The Republic, the
completely good city arises after the completely good soul.[34]
That is to say, psyche justice (personal
justice) must be cultivated prior to social
justice. On the other hand, Kant insists that there is only one
virtue and one theory of virtue, that is, a single system that unites all the
duties of virtue under one principle.[35]
Plato also believes that to uphold one virtue needs support from the complete
set of virtues. MacIntyre resorts toPlato’s idea that the virtues are not
merely compatible with each other, but the presence of each requires the
presence of all.297 That is to say, we can understand the concept of
Right only within the concept of ethics as a whole. Justice will not be
achieved unless the community and its citizens regard it as an inalienable part
of their complete virtues.
Accordingly, although Kant articulates
the doctrine of Right, he gives us a vision of respect for Right:
Respect for Right is meritorious.
For a man thereby makes the Right of humanity, or also the
Right of men, his end and in so doing widens his concept of
duty beyond the concept of what is due, since another can indeed by his right
require of me actions in accordance with the law, but not that the law be also
my incentive to such actions. The same holds true of the universal ethical
command, “act in conformity with duty from duty.” To establish and quicken this
disposition in oneself is meritorious, since it
goes beyond the law of duty for actions and makes the law itself also the
incentive.298
Generally, an action conforming to a
duty, e.g., to keep a promise made in a contract, might be done from internal duty (ethics) or from coercive duty (Right), or, more
commonly done from the both. What kind of incentive the subject
MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 142. MM
[391], p. 194.
for the right, he makes the “Right of
men”[36] his end. His action is done from internal incentive and it widens the
concept of duty beyond the concept of what is due. If this is the case, the action is
meritorious and moral,[37] because
we know that even if the capacity coercing him is loosened, he will still keep
the promise. But this resolve is from ethics, not from Right. He takes an
ethical view for his duty. At this time, he regards himself as a subject of
ethical duty, not a subject of coercive duty. Kant concludes:
The moral
capacity to constrain oneself can be called virtue, action
springing from such a disposition [respect for law] can be call virtuous
[ethical] action, even though the law lays down a duty of Right: for it is the doctrine of virtue that commands us to
hold the Right of men sacred.[38]
In Perpetual Peace Kant shows that the
principles of right (outer freedom) as being a technical task and as being a moral task are different. If
political, international and cosmopolitan rights are treated simply as
principles seeking to propose objects of the
will, the problems of right for politicians are mere technical tasks; but if
those rights are treated as principles which have absolute necessity, they are
moral tasks.[39] For Kant:
A moral task is
totally different in its execution from technical problems, to bring about
perpetual peace, which is desirable not just as a physical good, but also as a
state of affairs which must arise out of recognizing one’s duty.303
As Kant insists that the concept of
duty, ethical duty, inspired from our pure practical reason must take
precedence over all subjective ends, he offers the following advice:
Seek ye
first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and your
object (the blessing of perpetual peace) will be added unto you.
This Chapter indirectly refutes
Rawls’s notion that the political concept of justice is independent of all
ethical doctrines. In this chapter I have aimed to bring the concept of Right
back to ethics. I believe that as a part of ethics (which is characterized with
internal lawgiving, self-constraint and internal incentive), the concept of
Right will be more intelligible and sustainable.
304
Kant explains: “For morality, with regard to its principles of public right,
has the peculiar feature that the less it makes its conduct depend upon the
end it envisages (whether this is a physical or moral advantage), the more
it will in general harmonize with its end.” (“Perpetual Peace”, in Kant- Political Writings, p. 123.)
For Kant, the reason for this is that “it is precisely the general will as it
is given a priori,
within a single people or in the mutual relationships of various peoples, which
alone determines what is right among men. But this union of the will of all, if
only it is put into practice in a consistent way, can also, within the
mechanism of nature, be the cause which leads to the intended result and gives
effect to the concept of right.” (Ibid.)
……
This chapter tries to probe a moral
conception of freedom of action from is very foundation, the concept of
humanity. First of all, I criticize the deficiencies in Rawls’s and Mill’s
suggestions about the limits of freedom of action. Then I point out that before
we consider how we can legitimately interfere in one’s freedom of action by
using external coercion, we have to understand freedom of action from its two
senses, the narrow sense and the broad sense. The narrow sense of freedom of
action considers simply the Universal Law of Freedom which deals with a
reciprocal relation of individual rights. The narrow sense of freedom of action
puts the moral conception of freedom of action in a moral system as a whole and
conceives it as the residue of ethical duties, including duties of Right and
duties of virtue.
In order to sustain the narrow sense
of freedom of action, I investigate the concept of humanity which justifies
freedom of action and limits its scope. Contemporary thinkers tend to take the
concept of humanity for granted or prefer to understand it as a rational
attribute of men and obliterate the distinction between men’s moral rationality
and instrumental rationality. I spent more than thirty pages discussing Kant’s
notion of humanity and showing that human capacity for setting moral ends must
be the core and the foundation of humanity. We entitled to freedom of action
therefore not simply because of our capacity for setting ends of self-love or
ends following from hypothetical imperatives, but rather because that we are
moral beings.
Since we are moral beings, we impose
moral duties to ourselves. From a moral perspective, our freedom of action is
therefore limited by three criteria. (1) the Universal Law of Freedom; (2)
public rights and common goods; and (3) other ethical duties our pure practical
reason gives to us. There will be no priority among these three criteria for
all of them are ethical duties. Someone may question whether it is appropriate
to incorporate ethical duties in the criteria of limiting freedom of action
because Kant insists that ethical duties (viz. duties of virtue) cannot be
enforced by external laws. It seems to me there are two different
understandings of Kant. One understanding is that all ethical duties (viz.
duties of virtue) should be removed from external laws. Another understanding
is that since ethical duties require conformity from internal incentive, it is
impossible for us to procure internal conformity with ethical duties by using
external laws for their enforcement. I cling to the latter understanding and
contend that from the latter understanding the conclusion does not follow that
all ethical duties should be eliminated from external laws. My aim in this
Chapter is to provide a theoretically moral justification for our entitlement
to freedom of action and for its limitations, but I am aware of that other
criteria may be appealed for lawmaking and policymaking in practice.
The questions concerned
The question I endeavor to answer in
this dissertation is: why does morality in contemporary times decline and lose
its strength both in theory and practice? The reason for this may be
complicated. But what I am concerned with most is what sort of intellectual
trends or moral theories may cause or encourage the decay of moral practice.
This question has gone through the whole dissertation and I believe we will
know how to revive morality if we can answer this question well.
The liberal-communitarian debate has
gone on for more than twenty years. I appreciate the great contribution the
communitarians have achieved. But there are problems which communitarians have
raised which are still unsolved. We need a new perspective which interprets
morality from an angle different from communitarianism but which is vigorous
enough to solve the problems remaining from the communitarians. In this
dissertation I take Kant’s standpoint to criticize Rawls’s theory of justice,
especially concentrating on Kant’s metaphysics of morals, which deals with the determining
ground of the will, the faculty of moral reasoning, the concept of Right and
the idea of humanity. Since most contemporary liberal theories refuse to accept
any metaphysical assumptions, liberal thinkers must justify the principles they
formulate in some other way. For example, Rawls invents a procedural conception
of the original position as the platform where people choose the two principles
of justice. In this context, my main question of why morality has declined in
the contemporary world is therefore developed into four chapters and leads to
the following four conclusions:
An overall review
First, I distinguish principles
determined by the will which are grounded on the a priori moral law from principles determined
by the will which are grounded on the feeling of pleasure. In Kant’s view, the
former is the principles of morality (Kant calls them universal practical laws
or moral laws); the latter is spurious
morality (which Kant ascribes to rational practical precepts or
prudential counsels). In refusing to derive the principles of justice from
metaphysical, religious or ethical doctrines, Rawls can simply formulate his
principles in terms of the feeling of pleasure. According to Kant’s notion of
the determining ground of the will, the two principles of justice are chosen by
the feeling of pleasure as the determining ground of the will, and serve as prudential
counsels, that is, principles for finding means for one’s own happiness. A
prudential counsel only has subjectively
conditioned necessity. It is not fully objectively and universally
valid, and therefore it has less moral binding power. A society found on
prudential counsels is nevertheless a modus
vivendi.
Second, I argue that when the feeling
of pleasure is an object of the will, the faculty of reasoning for such a
principle must be technical practical
reason (purposive and instrumental reason), but not pure practical reason. For Kant, the former
is the faculty which finds means for the desired results, while the latter
finds moral ends. Sustaining Rawlsian society relies on the conception of
justice which is indeed a conception based on technical practical reason. Features
of Hobbesianism, such as mutual fear and reciprocal coercion also subsist in
the Rawlsian society. Because technical practical reason can simply recognize objects
as means, a good person for Rawls is defined as a person who possesses virtues
that are rationally needed by other citizens. In this sense, a person becomes a
means for others. There must therefore be a trait of anti-humanity underlying
in Rawls’s conception of justice.
The third Chapter contends that we
cannot derive morality from the concept of Right. The bearer of a right has
moral authorization to put others under obligation, but he requires merely an
external action conforming to the duty of Right. In this regard, persons who
are put under the duties of Right may present simply external actions in
accordance with their duties and do not necessarily have any internal incentive
following their conformity. Most likely, they conform to duties prescribed by
others for the sake of their own purposes, not simply for the sake of duty. For
Kant, only actions conforming to duty from duty (from internal incentive) can
be regarded as moral actions. Otherwise they are simply actions of legality. Right-based
theories which are anchored in the concept of Right establish a society of legality,
not a society of morality. I invent the phrase a “Right-morality gap” to depict
the rationale underlying the right-based society.
My last Chapter attempts to broaden
the liberals’ view of liberty through a study of humanity that renders us
rational and moral beings. I believe that to envisage the constraint of outer
freedom and to justify one’s outer freedom have the same theoretical and
practical importance. This chapter aims at establishing a feasible moral
foundation through examining outer freedom using the concept of humanity for
legislation and policy making when the government encounters problems in
protecting or limiting one’s outer freedom. For Kant, our humanity justifies
our entitlement to outer freedom and also gives limits to our outer freedom.
Humanity does not merely show our capacity to set ends, but rather manifests
our capacity to set moral ends. Therefore, I conclude that in addition to the
reciprocal coercion concerning the external actions of each individual, the
moral conception of freedom of action includes a doctrine that a person is
bound by public rights (collective rights) and the moral duties he sets for
himself. That is, a person is constrained by his ethical duties as well as by
the considerations of common good that
Republicanism and Communitarianism usually mention. I also suggest that even
though the criminal law tends not to enforce ethical duties, there is no ground
to remove all ethical duties which are inherent in the criminal law. Lawmakers
may decriminalize certain immoral actions because of prudential considerations,
but there is still an inner linkage between morals and external laws.
[1] Alasdair
MacIntyre, After Virtue. 6th ed., (London, 1994), p. 1.
[2] Charles
Taylor, Sources of
the Self, (Cambridge, 1989), Chapter III.
[3] After Virtue, pp. 6-8.
[4] MacIntyre
cites three arguments of abortion: “(a) Everybody has certain rights over his
or her own person, [...] therefore abortion is morally permissible and ought to
be allowed by law. [...] (b) I cannot will that my mother should have had an
abortion when she was pregnant with me. If I can not will this in my own case,
how can I consistently deny to others the right to life that I claim for
myself? [...] (c) Murder is wrong.” See After Virtue, p. 7.
[5] After Virtue , p. 7.
[6] According to
Macintyre, “emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more
specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference,
expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in
character.” See After
Virtue, pp. 11-12.
[7] MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 8.
[8] Francis Fukuvama.
The end of
History and the Last Man. (New York, 1992).
[9] Francis
Fukuyama. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (London. 1995).
[10] After Virtue, p. 257.
[11] Anscombe
writes: “To have a law conception
of ethics is to hold that what is needed for conformity with the virtues
failure in which is the mark of being bad qua man - (and
not merely, say qua craftsman
or logician) - that what is needed for this, is
required by divine law. Naturally it is not possible to have such a conception
unless you believe in God as a law-giver; like Jews, Stoics and Christians. But
if such a conception is dominant for many centuries, and then is given up, it
is a natural result that the concepts of ‘obligation’, of being bound or
required as by a law, should remain though they had lost their root; and if the
word ‘ought’ has become invested in certain contexts with the sense of
‘obligation’, it too will remain to be spoken with a special emphasis and a
special felling in these contexts.” See G E. M. Anscombe, “Modem Moral
Philosophy”, in Ethics.
Religion and Politics: The Collective Philosophical Papers of G E. M. Anscombe. (Oxford, 1981), pp. 26-42 (p. 30).
[12] G E. M
Anscombe, “Modem Moral Philosophy”, pp. 26-42.
[13] Charles
Taylor, “Atomism”, in Communitarianism and Individualism, ed. Avineri Shlomo and De-Shalit Avner, (Oxford, 1992), pp. 29-50
(p. 30).
[14] Michael
Sandel, Liberalism
and the Limits of Justice. (New York, 1983), p.
148.
[15] MacIntyre.
After
Virtue, p. 151.
[16] MacIntyre
says: “This socially embedded divorce between rales defining right action on
the one hand and conceptions of the human good on the other is one of those
aspects of such societies in virtue of which they are entitled to be called
liberal. For it is a central tenet of recent liberal moral and political theory
that public institutions and more especially the institutions of government
should be systematically neutral as between rival conceptions of what the human
good is. Allegiance to any particular conception of human good ought, on this
liberal view, to be a matter of private individual preference and choice, and it
is contrary to rationality to require of anyone that he or she should agree
with anyone else in giving his or her allegiance to some particular view.” See
Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Privatization of Good: An Inaugural Lecture”, in Liberalism-Communitarianism Debate, ed. C. F. Delaney (London, 1994), p. 3.
[17] Michael
Sandel. Liberalism
and the Limits of Justice, pp. 175-77.
[18] Ibid,
pp. 149-150.
[19] Rawls,
TJ, pp. 504-505. See also Rawls, PL [Lecture I], pp. 3, 6, 14, 18 and 29- 36;
[Lecture VIII], p. 293.
[20] Rawls,
PL [Lecture V],pp. 173-74.
[21] Ronald
Dworkin, “Liberal community”, California Law Review. 77 (3), p.
479. See also John Rawls, Political Liberalism. (New York,
1993) [Lecture V], pp. 201-06.
[22] Rawls, Political Liberalism [Lecture V], pp. 190-95.
[23] G W.
F. Hegel, Elements of
the Philosophy of Right trans. H. B. Nisbet, ed.
Allen Wood, (New York, 1998), [198].
[24] Michael
Slote, “Agent-Based Virtue Ethics”, in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp
and Michael Slote (New York, 1997).
[25] Immanuel
Kant, The
Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor
(Cambridge, 1991), the translator’s introduction, p. 2. For Kant’s own critics,
see GMM, section I.
[26] Immanuel Kant Fundamental Principles of the
Metaphvsic of Morals, trans. T. K. Abbott (New
York, 1988), pp. 65-66.
[27] Ibid, p. 65.
[28] C. B.
Macpherson, The
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. (Oxford: 1962), p. 63.
[29] GMM [4:441] and
[4:427].
[30] GMM [4:416], p.
44.
[31] Kant says: “To ensure
one’s own happiness is a duty. [...] He should promote his happiness not from
his inclination but from his duty.” See GMM [4:399], pp. 23-24. In this
context, Kant puts his conception of one’s happiness in his theory of duty
which has presupposed the moral law as its foundation. Therefore, “promoting one’s
own happiness” is under the limit of the moral law (see 4.4.1).
[32] TJ [25], pp. 142-43.
[33] Dworkin, Ronald.
“Foundations of Liberal Equality”, in Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner Lecture on Human Values, pp. 190-306.
[34] Gerasimos Santas, Goods and Justice: Plato. Aristotle,
and the Modems, (Oxford, 2001) pp.
149-150.
[35] MM, Preface.
[37] MM [390], p. 194
and [394], p. 198.
[38] MM [394], p. 198.
[39] Kant. “Perpetual
Peace”, in Kant:
Political Writings, p. 122.